


EU Energy Security and the Crisis in Crimea

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Myth? Reality?

Overview

1. Instability in Ukraine-Russian gas relations
2. Potential for a gas supply disruption
3. Impact of a potential suspension in gas transit via Ukraine on EU gas supplies
4. The EU's options for improving energy security

1. Russian-Ukrainian gas relations: Key themes

- **Prices** – Gas prices in FSU states (including Ukraine) and Russia's domestic market substantially lower than in Western Europe
- **Debts** – Ukraine accumulated large debts; Supply cuts throughout 1990s to enforce payment discipline
- **Commercial** – Regular renegotiation of supply and transit prices; Gazprom's desire to increase FSU price to West European levels
- **Politics** – Discounts in return for political concessions

1st January 2006: The 'first' disruption

- Upsurge in oil price in 2003 → Widened price gap
- Orange revolution (2004/05) and election of pro-Western Ukrainian government
- Gazprom attempted to impose higher prices, Naftogaz refused and supplies were cut off for three days → Supply shortfalls in EU Member States
- Dispute temporarily resolved by Gazprom supplying Ukraine with a mixture of full price Russian gas and cheaper gas from Turkmenistan

January 2009: The 'second' disruption

- Naftogaz accumulated massive debts to Gazprom (between \$1.6 and \$2.2 billion)
- Gazprom agreed to pay netback prices for imports from Central Asia in 2008
- Plans announced in 2009 by Russian Government to increase domestic prices to European netback by 2011
- Supplies to Ukraine halted → Accusations of Naftogaz siphoning off supplies → Full disruption for 13 days
- Timoshenko Resolution: European netback with a one year 20% discount

2009-2013: Unhealthy mixture of politics and economics

- Deal perceived to be unfair for Ukraine
 - Jump in oil prices 2009-2010 (\$43→\$76)
 - Kharkiv Accords – 30% discount in return for Sevastopol lease extension
- Price gap between Europe and Ukraine reversed
 - Jump in oil prices 2010-2011 (annual average \$110)
 - Gazprom gave temporary discounts to Western Europe to retain market share
 - Ukraine reduced consumption but continued to accumulate debts; Refused the 'Belarusian option'


2013-2014: Protests, Revolution and Crimea

- December 2013: Russia offered Ukraine 33% discount and \$15bn loan (\$3bn immediate bond purchase)
- February 2014: Naftogaz debt to Gazprom – \$3.25bn
 - Naftogaz paid \$1.47bn, requested deferral to April
 - Overthrow of Yanukovich → End of bond purchases
- March 2014: Russia cancelled discount and Sevastopol agreement

“Either Ukraine settles its debt and pays for current deliveries or the risk arises of a return to the situation we saw at the start of 2009” (Alexei Miller, Gazprom CEO)


2. Potential supply disruptions EU28 key statistics

Primary Energy Consumption, 2012



**Russian gas
accounts for
6.2% of Primary
Energy
Consumption**

Gas Supply, 2012




Differentiated Dependence on Russian Gas


	Dependence on imported gas	Share of Russian gas in	
		Gas imports	Gas consumption
Austria	78.9%	76.1%	60.0%
Bulgaria	97.7%	100%	83.3%
Croatia	34.5%	-	-
Czech Rep	98.0%	58.6%	57.5%
Germany	86.8%	43.0%	37.3%
Greece	100.0%	55.6%	55.6%
Hungary	78.2%	100.0%	78.2%
Italy	88.5%	32.6%	28.9%
Poland	72.0%	81.3%	58.6%
Romania	24.3%	100.0%	24.3%
Slovakia	98.4%	83.5%	82.2%
Slovenia	100.0%	60.2%	60.2%
CEE Average	79.8%	65.9%	52.1%
EU28 Total	66.2%	36.6%	24.2%

Gazprom and Russia's Dependence on Europe

**Gazprom
Sales
2012**



**Revenue
2012**



Some approximate figures:

- Half of Gazprom revenues come from European Gas Sales, 6% from Ukraine
- Gas accounts for 14% of Russian export sales (50% for oil)
- 50% of Federal Revenues come from oil (40%) and gas sales (10%)

Mutual dependence on transit (non-Baltic Europe)



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Gas Flow (billion cubic metres)

Capacity	Total 2012	Total 2013	March 2013
55.0	11.3	23.5	2.1
19.7%	9.2%	16.5%	17.4%
41.3	37.7	37.0	3.3
14.8%	26.0%	25.9%	28.1%
182.9	78.8	82.3	6.5
65.5%	64.7%	57.6%	54.5%

Sources: IEA Gas Trade Flows in Europe,
Nord Stream website

Nord Stream and Belarus pipelines were constructed to diversify transit away from Ukraine

Potential for supply disruptions

- Economic suicide for Russia to disrupt all energy supplies on all routes (very unlikely)
- Difficult Ukraine-Russia gas relations
 - Russia and Gazprom – how to recover debts without Ukraine default/siphoning off supplies
 - Ukraine and Naftogaz – little prospect for servicing debt
- Political tensions + Commercial issues = Potential for gas disruption on Ukraine route only
- Further military action in Ukraine could lead to non-commercial shut-offs (unlikely at this point)


3. Impact of supply disruptions:

Key factors

- Alternative transit routes?
- Alternative supplies?
- Will storage be able to compensate for shortfalls?
- Can the gas reach affected areas via interconnectors?

Modelling possible based on past experience
and most recent data (2013)

The 2009 Gas Supply Disruption



Potential impact of a disruption: Preparation since 2009

Key factors

- Alternative transit routes?
- Alternative supplies?
- Will storage be able to compensate for shortfalls?
- Can the gas reach affected areas via interconnectors?

Preparation in EU

- Nord Stream – alternative transit route
- Potential supplies from Algeria, Norway and LNG
- More storage
- More reverse-flow interconnections
- National and regional emergency plans under EU regulation 994/2010

Potential impact of a disruption: Transit to Europe



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March 2013 Levels (mcm/day)			
Route	Capacity	Flow in March 2013	Spare Capacity
Nord Stream	150.7	66.6	84.1
Yamal Europe (Kondratki)	97.4	97.1	0.3
Beltransgaz (Wysokoje)	15.8	10.7	5.1
Ukraine-Poland (Drozdowice)	16.6	13.8	2.8
Ukraine-Slovakia (Velke Kapusany)	323.0	122.0	201.0
Ukraine-Hungary (Beregdaroc)	56.4	14.4	42.0
Ukraine-Romania (Mediesu Aurit)	9.1	0.2	8.9
Ukraine-Romania (Orlovka-Isaccea)	96.0	58.3	37.7
Flows via Ukraine	501.1	208.7	292.4
Flows via other routes	263.9	174.4	89.5

Potential impact of a disruption: Transit within Europe



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Imports in March 2013 (million cubic metres/day)

Country	Via Ukraine	Total
Austria*	14.30	14.30
Bulgaria*	7.90	7.90
Croatia*	3.96	3.96
Czech Rep	11.19	27.59
Greece	6.56	9.44
Hungary*	21.48	21.48
Italy	83.87	172.74
Poland	13.83	31.53
Romania*	4.96	4.96
Slovakia*	14.84	14.84
Slovenia*	3.16	3.16
Average	16.91	28.35
82.1%		

Percentages are for share of Ukrainian transit in total gas imports

Asterisks indicate countries where Ukrainian transit accounts for 100% of imports

Source: IEA Gas Trade Flows in Europe

Potential impact of a disruption: Storage



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Best available figures for March (2013 for imports, 2014 for storage)

Country	Imports via Ukraine (mcm/day)	Maximum withdrawal (mcm/day)	Difference	Gas in storage on 10/03/14 (mcm)	Number of Days Supply
Austria	14.30	44.16	+29.86	1237.80	87
Bulgaria	7.90	3.50	-4.40	200.00	57
Czech Republic	11.19	33.09	+21.90	960.00	86
Greece	6.56	-	-	-	-
Hungary	24.48	79.58	58.10	1273.92	59
Italy	83.87	230.40	146.53	8111.71	97
Poland	13.83	33.85	20.02	1300.90	64
Romania	4.96	30.30	25.34	~1000.00	202
Slovakia	14.84	41.15	26.31	1171.00	79
Regional	167.41	496.03	+323.66	15255.33	95

4. Future Options: Diversification of Suppliers

US Shale Gas

- Requires granting of export licences
- Not available until around 2016
- Competition with Asian market

EU Shale Gas

- Environmental opposition in several Member States
- Major uncertainties over reserves
- Unlikely before 2020

Azeri Gas via TAP pipeline (Turkey-Greece-Albania-Italy)

- 10bcm initially (2018), later 30bcm (by 2026)
- Security concerns due to bordering Russia and Georgia
- Potential for other supplies (Central Asia, Middle East)

Future Options: Diversification of Transit



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Source: http://www.south-stream.info/fileadmin/f/maps/eng/eng_blank.png
Additional potential pipeline routes based on authors' own research



Future Options: Adaptation within Europe

Diversification of energy mix

- Limited options, due to cost and climate commitments

Interconnectors

- Romania-Bulgaria → Would help Bulgaria, but not Macedonia

Gas Storage

- Gas has to come from somewhere!

Complete the Internal Energy Market

- More attractive market / Stronger bargaining position
- Future security of demand problems in Russia

Conclusions

- EU and Russia are characterised by mutual dependency → Total energy shut-off very unlikely
- Long-standing instability in Ukraine-Russian gas relations is the main factor in any potential supply disruption
- Ukraine transit disruption could be mitigated for around three months, except in Bulgaria
- No silver bullet to improve EU energy security

Read the research

Long version

Sharples, J. and Judge, A. (2014) 'Russian Gas Supplies to Europe: the Likelihood, and Potential Impact, of an Interruption in Gas Transit via Ukraine', *The European Geopolitical Forum: Energy Special Contribution*, 20th March, <http://gpf-europe.com/forum/?blog=energy&id=157>

Short version

Sharples, J. and Judge, A. (2014) 'Bulgaria and Macedonia would be hardest hit by a suspension of Russian gas exports through Ukraine', *LSE EUROPP Blog*, 13th March, <http://bit.ly/1gnh8IG>

Contact Details




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